Elections are highly complex processes, and each process and step carries the risk of human or technical error. Ballot counting and results reporting are not immune to these risks. As election officials know, election night reporting (ENR) is always unofficial. The canvass period exists precisely to catch and correct errors before results are certified.
Unfortunately, from an election security perspective, inadvertent reporting errors and actual security incidents can look identical to an outside observer. That ambiguity is itself a vulnerability, one that bad actors can exploit to cast doubt on legitimate results. Reducing the frequency of reporting errors is therefore not just an operational goal; it also supports security.
The following incidents show how procedural breakdowns in ENR can present an election security risk. When unofficial reported totals shift unexpectedly, even due to routine corrections, it can be mischaracterized as evidence of manipulation, eroding public trust in ways that are difficult to reverse.
Chicago, Illinois – March 2024 Primary
In Chicago’s March 2024 primary, more than 10,000 vote-by-mail ballots received the day before the election were not included in the tally until three days later. The ballots were properly secured at the facility of the Chicago Board of Elections, awaiting processing, but were inadvertently left untallied. Both candidates in the most closely watched contest confirmed publicly that they trusted the Board’s chain of custody.
The omitted mail-in ballots were ultimately added to the unofficial total. The gap in reported numbers was characterized in some social media as evidence of mishandling. This episode illustrates the pressure officials face to report quickly on Election Night and the downstream consequences when speed comes at the expense of completeness.
Iowa’s 2nd Congressional District – November 2020 General
In Iowa’s 2020 race for the 2nd Congressional District, two separate counties reported incomplete results due to human errors. An error in Jasper County briefly shifted the unofficial lead when staff incorrectly transferred ballot counts to an internal spreadsheet used for reporting results. Then, in Lucas County, pre-election test data for an entire precinct had not been fully cleared, so it was included in the initial reporting rather than the precinct’s actual results.
The Iowa Secretary of State ordered countywide recounts in both Jasper and Lucas counties. Importantly, the Lucas County auditor caught the error during canvass preparation, before certification, demonstrating that built-in verification steps work when they are followed.
However, because the unofficial margin in this Congressional District race fluctuated to the point that each candidate led by more than 100 votes after different recounts, the campaigns ultimately requested a districtwide recount of all 24 counties. The full recount took nearly two weeks, and the certified result of the race was a narrow six-vote margin.
Actions You Can Take:
Ultimately, each step on the path to certified results – tabulation, aggregation, upload, and reporting – is a potential point of failure. The common thread in the incidents above is that the process broke down. When breakdowns occur, they can create security risks beyond operations, opening the door to narratives or perceived grievances that undermine confidence in the process. Understanding where those gaps can occur is the first step toward preventing them.
- Distinguish counting from reporting. Treat your results upload process with the same rigor as your tabulation process, with checklists of flash drives and verification steps.
- Clear test data before Election Night. Confirm your testing protocol includes a verified clearing step. Expectations should be clearly defined in writing.
- Develop redundancies in your reporting process. A second set of eyes performing independent verification can catch errors that a single person can miss. Building in redundancy doesn’t signal distrust; rather, it reflects the same professionalism that defines strong procedures.
- Test the full process. Pre-election testing that stops short of the upload step leaves the most consequential part of the workflow unverified. Walk through the entire chain, from tabulation through aggregation to results submission, so that staff are familiar with each step and can identify potential errors before Election Night.
Plan your communications response now. When a correction is needed, the window to frame it accurately is narrow before others fill the vacuum with misleading narratives. Officials who can clearly explain the situation will foster greater public confidence.
The Situation Room focuses on real security incidents and threats in the news relevant to election security. To review previous issues, see the newsletter archive.